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Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure 
G.A. Leonards 
Professor. School of Civil Engineering. Purdue University. West Lafayette. Indiana. 
U.S.A. 
Baldwin Hills is located in a suburb of the city of 
Los Angeles about midway between the city center and the 
L.A. International Airport. 
The reservoir was designed by the staff of the Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power. It was a small 
reservoir whose storage capacity was less than 900 
acre-ft. and, on the average, the maximum depth of water 
was 65 ft. Site investigations were started in 1939 and 
continued with increasing intensity through 1947, which 
included the early part of the construction period. The 
reservoir location and a general site plan is shown in 
FIG. 1. 
FIG. 1. Location and General Site Plan of Baldwin 
Hills Reservoir 
The reservoir was fashioned out of a steep ravine 
by excavation at the abutments and filling in the eroded 
valleys. The main dam is at the north face of the 
reservoir and has a maximum heiqht of about 200 feet. 
E-W cross sections through the axis of the main dam, and 
through the gate tower, are shown in FIGS. 2 and 3. 
SITE CONDITIONS 
The relevant geologic stratum is the Inglewood 
formation, a marine deposit of early Pleistocene age 
that consists mainly of thinly bedded fine sand, silt, 
and clayey silt. Some of the strata are moderately well 
cemented but others are composed of loose, powdery sands 
and silts extremely susceptible to erosion. 
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E-W Cross-section Through Axis of Main Dam 
(tangent section only) 
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E-W Cross-section Through the Gate Tower 
Oil fields adjoin the reservoir on the south and west, 
and the existence of an associated subsidence bowl was 
known. The Inglewood fault, an active fault that is a 
branch of the San Andreas system, lies within 600 feet 
of the west rim of the reservoir. Tectonic and seismic 
activity associated with the Inglewood fault was well 
recognized. Auxiliary faults crossed the reservoir in a 
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eneral N-S direction, as shown in F~G: 4. The ~ate ~ower was moved eastward from its orlgfln~i lo~atp~~~o~~aph 
avoid positioning it directly over a au . . 
of fault I, exposed by excavation near the gate.tower ln 




FIG. 4. Location of Auxiliary Faults 
FIG. 5. Photograph of Auxiliary Fault I 
of the soil along the planes of weakness. The consensus 
of opinion was that the auxiliary faults were not active, 
although the Department's geologist reported apparently 
fresh slickensides along the structural weakness planes 
(Wilson, 1949). Because the reservoir was in an active 
seismic zone, the embankments were designed to resist a 
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horizontal acceleration of 0.2 g. To design, construc1 
and operate a safe reservoir in an area subject to slo~ 
tectonic movements and seismic activity in nearby majot 
faults within a zone of regional subsidence due to 
pumping from adjacent oil fields, and at a site traver~ 
by auxiliary faults and underlain by low density~ easi l 
erodible soil was, indeed, an extremely challeng1ng 
assignment. 
DESIGN CONCEPT 
The basic design concept adopted for the reservoi1 
is illustrated in FIG. 6. The designers recognized th; 
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FIG. 6. Main Features of Reservoir Lining 
the security of the reservoir was critically dependen1 
preventing water from seeping into the foundation soil 
The main line of defense was a 10ft. thick clay linir 
(tapering to 5 ft. at the top of the embankment slope~ 
To maintain flexibility, the clay was compacted to 92 
percent of the standard Proctor maximum density at a ~ 
content 5.5 percent wet of optimum. As a second line 
defense, a 1/4 in. asphalt membrane was sprayed on thE 
subgrade soils in two coats. An open weave cotton fat 
was placed between the asphalt coatings at points of 
stress concentration. No effort was spared to constrl 
a membrane as free of defects as possible and all opet 
tions were inspected with special thoroughness. 
A 4 in . cemented pea gravel drain was constructec 
between the clay lining and the asphalt membrane to 
collect any seepage through the lining and convey it 1 
central observation and measuring station, called the 
drainage inspection chamber (FIG. 4). 
A separate foundation drainage system was provid1 
A 12-inch vitrified clay tile pipe with open joints, 
whose upper half was covered with cemented pea gravel 
was installed to drain the main dam. The drain passe• 
through successive manholes where seepage could be ob· 
served. Markers were placed at regular intervals alo1 
the drain to monitor settlements (FIG. 7) . Each of tl 
smaller embankments enclosing the reservoir had simil, 
foundation drains (FIG. 8). Wherever local seepage z, 
were encountered, vertical or horizontal drain holes 1 
drilled and filled with sand. These local drains we~ 
connected to the foundation drain system with 4 in. c 
tile pipe (FIG. 8). 
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FIG. 8. Plan of Foundation and Reservoir Drainage 
Systems 
Additional tile drains at the toes of the reservoir 
slopes, and a special fault drain were installed and fed 
directly into the drainage inspection chamber. Thus, 
leakage from separate segments of the reservoir under-
drainage system, and from the toes of the reservoir 
slopes, could be measured independently. 
The main design concept was to control leakage with 
the clay liner. Normal seepage through the lining would 
be collected and monitored. In the unlikely event that 
a crack would develop in the lining, it was expected that 
the reinforced, flexible asphaltic membrane would remain 
intact. Increased seepage through the lining would be 
observed in the inspection chamber and its location noted. 
Ample time would be available to drain the reservoir and 
effect repairs. 
CONSTRUCTION 
Construction was initiated by the Department's con-
struction forces early in 1947 and was completed by 
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contract in April 1951. Except for a small slide along 
a clay seam that occurred during excavation of the east 
abutment, which was readily stabilized, no unexpected con-
ditions were encountered. Although the designers were 
confident of the dam's safety -- and a Consulting Board 
concurred in this judgment -- additional monitoring sys-
tems were installed to warn of any impending danger. 
These included surface monuments for settlement measure-
ments at 50 ft. intervals along the crest, and bench 
marks to measure settlement of the gate tower and of the 
inlet and outlet tunnels. Later, as the need arose, 
strain gages to monitor separation of construction joints 
in the parapet wall and of cracks that developed in the 
drainage inspection chamber, as well as piezometers, 
inclinometers, and seismoscopes, were also installed. 
DEVELOPMENT OF FAILURE 
When put into service in 1951, the dam was con-
sidered a model of engineering excellence -- in design, 
construction methods, and monitoring systems. It was 
kept under close surveillance for 12 years. At 11:15 a.m. 
on Dec. 14, 1963 the caretaker heard a faint sound of 
running water emanating from the spillway discharge pipe. 
By 11:30 a.m. he had determined that the N.E. and S.E . 
toe drains, and the fault drain, were discharging muddy 
water in the inspection chamber like "fire hoses", and 
at 11:35 a.m. he sounded the alarm by telephone. At 
12:20 p.m. measures to drain the reservoir were imple-
mented; at 1:30 p.m., when sandbagging of a hole that 
developed in the north embankment slope proved futile, 
heroic evacuation measures were initiated. Five lives 
were lost, and the insurance carriers promptly paid off 
$12,000,000 dollars in damages. Law suits were then 
initiated to recover the losses. 
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE FAILURE 
A number of independent investigations were initia-
ted immediately after the failure. However, the only 
readily available published report to be issued was pre-
pared by a Board of Inquiry appointed by the State of 
California, and chaired by Robert Jansen (State of 
California, 1964). A Consulting Board chaired by J. Barry 
Cooke recorded their agreement with the findings in this 
report, which remains the primary source of information 
on the design, operation, surveillance, and post-failure 
investigations of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir. Addition-
al valuable information and analyses were published in 
the Proceedings of the Purdue Conference by Leps (1972), 
and by Casagrande, Wilson and Schwantes (1972), following 
the settlement of lawsuits out of court in 1970. In 
briefest summary, the conclusions of the State Board of 
Inquiry were: 
I. " ... that earth movement occurred at the 
Baldwin Hills Reservoir on December 14, 1963, fol-
lowing long-term development of stress and dis-
placement in the foundation. The movement was 
apparently not seismic, but it did take place at 
faults which were planes of foundation weaknesses. 
Progressively increasing displacement finally re-
sulted in rupture of the reservoir lining and 
consequent entry of water under pressure into the 
faulted foundation. Erosion of the foundation 
proceeded rapidly, causing uncontrolled leakage 
which led to total failure." 
II. "The earth movement which triggered the 
reservoir failure evidently was caused primarily 
by subsidence which had been observed in the vici-
nity for many years. Apparently the stage for 
destruction of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir was be-
ing set even before conception of the facility." 
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There appears to be general agreement with conclu-
sion I. Conclusion II was supported by Hudson and Scott 
{1965) and Castle and Yerkes {1976), and strongly argued 
by Leps {1972). Hamilton and Meehan (1971) related the 
acceleration of crack openings in the drainage inspection 
chamber, which became evident early in 1958, to fluid 
injections initiated to increase the yield from the 
Inglewood oil field. Subsidence and slow tectonic move-
ments certainly contributed to the observed displacements 
at the reservoir; however, in mY opinion, it is not pos-
sible to establish, quantitatively, the relative contri-
butions of regional movements, differential compression 
of the foundation strata due to reservoir loading, and 
slow seepage of water from the reservoir into the under-
lying erodible soils. On the other hand, it is possible 
to establish that events damaging to the reservoir's 
security occurred so soon after it was put into service 
that they could not possibly be attributed to slow re-
gional movements. For example, during first filling of 
the reservoir in April of 1951, leakage was observed to 
increase dramatically in the foundation drains adjacent 
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FIG. 9. Measured Leakage vs. Reservoir Level During 
First Filling of the Reservoir (after 
Casagrande, et al., 1972) 
emptied. The asphaltic pavement protecting the clay lin-
ing was observed to have buckled· along the toe of the 
inside slope along the east side of the reservoir. Also, 
a 3/4-in. differential settlement had occurred between 
the Elev. 418 channel inlet structure and the gate tower. 
A~t~m~ts to seal the leaks were made by grouting in the 
v1c1n1ty of the gate tower, and by replacing the roofing-
paper gaskets in the joints between the inlet structure 
and the gate tower with rubber gaskets. 
During June 1951, the reservoir was refilled. Again, 
the southeast toe and fault drains immediately responded 
with large flows. Subsequent attenuation of the flow 
rate was interpreted to mean that the leaks were "self-
sealing" (FIG. 10). Instead, it appears that the asphalt 
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membrane was ruptured and seepage entered into the fou 
ation to begin a long-term process of progressive move 
ments -- aided and abetted by regional subsidence. Th 
view is supported by the settlement record of the gate 
tower, crack initiation and growth in the inspection 
chamber, and by the early pattern of subsidence that 
developed across the reservoir floor (FIG. 11). In ad 
(feet) 0 50 100 200 
HORIZONTAL SCALE 
(toot) 
FIG. 11. Relative Settlement Across Reservoir Floor 
in E-H Direction (total movement minus 
regional subsidence, after Casagrande, 
et al., 1972) 
tion, post failure investigations disclosed cavities i 
the locale of fault I nearly 50 feet below the reserve 
floor -- evidence of long-term seepage erosion -- whic 
is supported by calcification detected on the surfaces 
some of the cavities. It may be that some cavities pr 
dated construction of the reservoir. In any case, col 
lapse of cavities due to progressive seepage erosion a 
subsidence would occur suddenly; the effect on the al-
ready weakened clay liner would be to rupture it suffi 
ciently so that water could enter the foundation under 
pressure. I believe that this is the most likely mech 
anism that triggered the rapid demise of the reservoir 
December 14, 1963. 
In the early years following the failure, the tri 
gering mechanisms were of paramount interest because t 
main concerns were with the assignment of liability. 
However, the thrust of this paper is to examine the le 
sons to be learned from the ensuing disaster. Thus fa 
only Casagrande, et al. (1972) have published views of 
the lessons learned. These are quoted as follows: 
Lesson 
"The failure of the reservoir was caused by 
foundation strata highly sensitive to erosion 
and crossed by faults. The safety of the reser-
voir depended on preventing water from the re-
servoir entering these strata and the faults;" 
"It is debatable whether a safe reservoir 
could have been designed for these conditions. 
Probably only a steel lining could have given 
reasonable assurance of safety. Other measures 
would have extended the life of the reservoir 
without ensuring the degree of safety that must 
be demanded of such a reservoir." 
Lesson I I 
"The observational records show that the 
magnitude of these movements [subsidence, ac-
companied by tensile strains] was so small, in-
cluding the differential settlements across 
Faults I and V, that it would not harm most of 
the earth dams and reservoir with which the 
authors are familiar." 
"The authors seriously question whether any 
important dam and reservoir should be permitted 
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to be constructed if it cannot withstand with 
perfect safety movements of such magnitude [i.e., 
those due to regional subsidence]. This may well 
be the principal lesson to be learned from this 
case record." 
In the past two decades, and especially since 
rerzaghi's "observational method" was so eloquently.arti-
culated by Peck (1969), monitoring the performance of 
structures has become part and parcel of geotechnical en-
gineering design. The approach is by no means new, as it 
was practiced some 800 years ago by the builders of the 
Tower of Pisa more boldly than most engineers would be 
willing to espouse today (Leonards, 1979). Among the 
essential features for success of the observational method, 
clearly delineated by Peck, is the necessity that the 
observations provide sufficient warning in time to pre-
vent failure from occurring. This implies prior deter-
mination of a course of action whenever the measurements 
reach pre-determined critical values. The designers of 
Baldwin Hills were aware of all the hazards to safety 
posed by the site: they knew that the soils were highly 
erodible, and that it was crucial to prevent seepage from 
the reservoir from entering the foundation soils; they 
were aware of the ongoing ground movements, although some 
would argue they may not have appreciated fully the dan-
ger that was posed; and they not only knew of the faults 
crossing the reservoir but had the opportunity to observe 
the fragile nature of fault I, which was exposed during 
the early stages of construction (Fig. 5). They provided 
two lines of defense: (1) a 10ft. thick clay lining 
specially constructed to possess considerable flexibility, 
and (2) an underlying cloth-reinforced asphalt membrane 
to protect the erodible foundation in the event the lin-
ing was ruptured. A comprehensive monitoring system was 
established to warn of impending danger, including settle-
ments of the foundation drain under the main dam, the 
crest of the dam, the gate tower, and the surrounding area. 
Later on, piezometers, inclinometers and seismoscopes 
were added, and provisions were made to measure separa-
tion of construction joints on the parapet wall and of 
cracks that developed in the drainage inspection chamber. 
However, prime reliance was placed on a compartmentalized 
underdrain system to measure, independently, seepage from 
separate segments of the reservoir and its foundation. A 
rigorous surveillance regimen was established and faith-




- Seepage from underdrain networks 
- Surveys for settlement at the reser-
voir and of the surrounding area 
- Inspection by a squad of maintenance 
personnel, and review ~f the results 
of all measurements, including those 
from the strain gages, tiltmeters, 
and seismoscopes. (The last regular 
inspection was on Nov. 26, 1963). 
Safety inspection by the State Dam 
Safety Office. (The last inspection 
was on April 3, 1963.) 
All these efforts notwithstanding, the first indica-
tion of danger was at 11:15 a.m. on the day of failure, 
when the caretaker on routine rounds heard a faint sound 
of running water emanating from the spillway discharge 
pipe. Investigation revealed that the sound was the re-
sult of discharge from the 24 in. blowoff pipe where it joined the spillway discharge pipe. Upon verifying the 
high rate of muddy discharge from the underdrains direct-
ly in the inspection chamber, the caretaker sounded the 
alarm by telephone at 11:35 a.m. --too late to stem the 
flow or lower the reservoir sufficiently to prevent 
breaching of the dam a mere four hours later. 
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REVIEW OF SURVEILLANCE MEASUREMENTS 
It is pertinent to review the results of the sur-
veillance program-- a 13-year record of measurements 
carefully taken, faithfully plotted, and regularly exam-
ined. In hindsight, and in the light of current knowledge, 
should the alarm have been raised and the reservoir 
drained before December 1963? Space limitations permit 
review only of a few key results. Settlements along the 
12-inch foundation underdrain are shown in FIG. 12. 
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FIG. 12. Settlement Along 12-inch Foundation 
Underdrain 
Settlement vs. fill height at any given time are reasonably 
regular. The settlement vs. time under 155 ft. of fill 
shows that the time dependent settlements are nearly dou-
ble the immediate settlement. One might ask whether this 
should be expected if no water was seeping into the 
foundation, but this is easy to do in hindsight. At the 
time, the regular settlement pattern, and their monotonic 
attentuation with time, was apparently taken to be normal. 
I was unable to obtain tabulations of the monthly 
crest settlement measurements. However, the crest settle-
ment patterns published in the State of California Report 
(1964) are shown in FIG. 13. The sharp curvatures dis-
played are due to the distorted scales that were adopted; 
the patterns themselves reveal, positively, only the 
FIG. 13. Settlement Records of Perimeter Parapet Wall 
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locations of maximum subsidence, which correspond to the 
location of fault I. A plot of the maximum crest settle-
ment vs. time is shown in FIG. 14. It appears that 
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FIG. 14. Maximum Crest Settlement vs. Time 
around 1957 (when fluid injection in the adjacent oil 
field was underway), the rate of settlement began to 
depart from the extrapolated path but, again, this is 
easy to recognize in hindsight. In the absence of an 
exeected settlement-time relationship, and a stated 
cr1terion of unacceptable departures from the norm, the 
plot - in itself - is not decisive. 
The simplified procedure proposed by Leonards and 
Narain (1963) was used to calculate the strain distribu-
tion along the crest and base of the dam using the mea-
sured settlement patterns (FIG. 15)**. The results, 
3+00 5+00 7+00 9+00 2+,oo 1 4+,oo I 8+,oo I a+,oo ~oo 
1 4 f.: FAULT 1 ~! 
. ~~ 
z 1•2 PARAPET JOINT ~E 
~ 1.0 SEPARATION AT STA. 9+14 '"' 
ffi O.B CRACK ON CREST ~ ~ 
! .. 1 0.8 OF DAM AT STA. 8+94 ~: : 0.4 :::o 
t; o.2 __ L 
FIG. 15. Strain Distribution Along the Crest of 
the Main Dam 
**The calculations were performed by Sunil Sharma, 
Graduate Assistant, Purdue University. 
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although approximate, are revealing. As it was not pass· 
ble to obtain samples to measure the tensile strain at 
cracking, it was estimated to be approximately 0.2% stra' 
(Leonards and Narain, 1963). The locations at which the 
calculated tensile strains exceeded the estimated crackil 
strain agreed with the locations at which cracking was ol 
served to occur at the crest of the dam. What is of cru· 
cial importance, however, is the observation that at the 
base of the dam the critical tensile cracking strain had 
already been exceeded in 1957. Had it been possible to 
make such calculations prior to 1963, they may have led 
to more ~r~quent lowering of the reservoir and inspectio1 
of the l1n1ng. In that event, the catastrophe most like' 
would have been avoided. 
The safety of the reservoir was crucially dependent 
on the ability of the asphaltic membrane to prevent seep· 
age from the reservoir from entering the highly erodible 
foundation soils. An extensive monitoring system was 
installed- which was very advanced for its time- in 
order to provide an early alert should the compacted cla· 
liner be damaged. The designers apparently expected the· 
clay liner to crack first while the asphaltic membrane 
remained intact; in that event, increased flow in the 
underdrains would provide an alert that the clay liner 
was damaged in time to lower the reservoir and effect re 
p~irs. The fatal flaw in the design was that the asphal 
t1c membrane must have cracked either before or at the 
s~me time that the clay liner was damaged, thereby permi 
t1ng seepage to enter the foundation soils and begin the 
process that ultimately led to the demise of the reservo 
As described in the preceding paragraphs, the time-
settlement records along the 12-inch foundation underdra 
and of the parapet wall, gave clues to impending disaste 
but these are clearly apparent only with the benefit of 
hindsight. Comparison of calculated strains in the em-
b~nkment with expected cracking strains would have pro-
Vlded an early alert that cracking had developed in the 
lin!ng, but the ~nalysis needed for this purpose became 
ava1lable only n1ne months before the failure. Consider 
the crucial nature of the integrity of the asphaltic mem 
brane, instrumentation that could directly detect damage 
to the membrane was needed, but this would have been ver 
difficult to accomplish under the prevailing circumstanc 
The lessons to be learned from these experiences ar 
summarized below. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
I. A MONITORING SYSTEM INTENDED TO WARN 
OF IMPENDING DANGER MUST BE OF SUCH A NATURE, 
AND BE SO LOCATED, THAT THE CRITICAL FACTORS 
CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE ARE BEING SENSED. 
THIS IMPLIES FULL APPRECIATION OF THE PHYSICAL 
FACTORS INVOLVED -- AN APPRECIATION THAT IS NOT 
ALWAYS EASY TO COME BY. 
II. A MONITORING SYSTEM THAT FAILS TO 
WARN OF IMPENDING DANGER IN TIME TO AVOID FAIL-
URE CAN BE WORSE THAN NO SYSTEM AT ALL: IT 
TENDS TO INSTILL FALSE CONFIDENCE, AND ~~AY DE-
LAY CAREFUL INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE OPERA-
TIONS. 
III. TO BE SUCCESSFUL, A SUITABLE ANALY-
TICAL FRAMEWORK MUST BE AVAILABLE TO INTERPRET 
THE MEASUREMENTS. ACCEPTABLE LIMITS TO MEA-
SURED VALUES MUST BE PREDETERMINED, AND A 
DECISIVE PLAN OF ACTION AGREED UPON, IN THE 
EVENT THAT LIMITING VALUES ARE EXCEEDED. 
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IV. IN SPITE OF OTHER SIMILAR INCIDENTS, 
e.g. VAJONT DAM AND BAKER POWERHOUSE SLIDES, 
I-95 AND KING'S LYNN TEST EMBANKMENTS (LEONARDS, 
1982), THESE LESSONS ARE APPARENTLY NOT WIDELY 
APPRECIATED EVEN TODAY -- AS EVIDENCED BY THE 
UNEXPECTED CATASTROPHIC SLIDE (148 LIVES LOST) 
AT THE GUAVIO HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT NEAR BOGOTA, 
IN JULY 1983, AND OF THE SUDDEN LARGE SLIP OF 
THE UPSTREAM SLOPE OF THE CARSINGTON RESERVOIR, 
IN ENGLAND, IN JUNE OF 1984. 
V. SUITABLE BASES TO INTERPRET IN ADVANCE 
WHEN THERE IS DANGER OF IMPENDING FAILURE ARE 
STILL LACKING IN THE CASE OF MANY TYPES OF GEO-
TECHNICAL STABILITY PROBLEMS. MORE RESEARCH 
ALONG THESE LINES IS BADLY NEEDED. 
EPILOGUE 
Could a safe and economical reservoir have been 
lt at the Baldwin Hills site? I believe the answer 
YES, provided the following prerequisites were 
isfied: 
1. The monitoring system must provide a 
positive indication that seepage through 
the impervious asphalt membrane had com-
menced before significant erosion of the 
foundation soils could occur; and 
2. The asphalt membranes must be access-
ible for ready repair. 
Both these prerequisites could be satisfied by con-
·ucting the liner illustrated in FIG. 16. The main 
'ference between this scheme and the one that was act-
lly used is the relocation of the asphalt membranes 
l pea gravel drains from below to above the compacted 
IY liner. As long as the asphalt membranes remain 
tact, no seepage could reach the foundation soils. 
Juld sufficient movement occur to rupture the upper 
G. 16. 
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unreinforced asphalt membrane, the drains would have 
access to full reservoir head and larqe flows would im-
mediately be detected in the drainage-inspection chamber. 
Shut-off valves in the inspection chamber would close 
automatically to prevent water from flowing at high velo-
cities in the discharge lines. It would be a simple 
matter to lower the reservoir and effect repairs. It is 
likely that the underlying reinforced asphalt membrane 
would remain intact, hence only the upper asphalt membrane 
(which is readily accessible) would need to be repaired. 
However, even if the reinforced asphalt membrane and the 
underlying clay blanket also cracked, the reservoir could 
be lowered long before significant damage to the founda-
tion could occur because, in the absence of collapse in 
the foundation soils, the cracked clay blanket would 
prevent water under pressure from entering the foundation. 
Repairs would be less convenient but not overly expensive. 
There would never be any concern that slow insidious 
seepage could cause sudden collapses of sufficient magni-
tude to permit water under pressure to erode the founda-
tion soils. 
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